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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution never established the right to appeal.1  The 
common law never recognized the appeal as an absolute right.2  Any “right” to 
appeal is “purely a creature of statute”3 that evolved to become a central component 
in the litigation process.4 
Thus, imagine civil litigation without the appeal.  A pretrial motion is filed, and 
the judge denies it.  The case continues, and the parties endure litigation that 
culminates in a trial.5  An unfavorable judgment is rendered.  The client’s mid-size 
company just spent over two years6 investing at least one million dollars in 
litigation.7  Looking at the record, the court clearly erred in failing to grant the 
pretrial motion to dismiss.  But, the case is over.  One million dollars later, the 
attorney and client find no relief from legal community.  
The imagined situation is often the reality even where the appeal process exists.  
For instance, the current use of the federal interlocutory appeal process operates 
much like an appeal-less system.  A pretrial motion is filed, the interlocutory order is 
given, and the petition for interlocutory review is usually denied.8  Thus, the case 
continues.  It may continue into settlement negotiations or go to trial where the 
losing party files an appeal.  That final appeal could find that the lower court erred, 
                                                           
 1 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see also McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 
(1894).  
 2 McKane, 153 U.S. at 684. 
 3 Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977). 
 4 Some form of an appeal always existed in the federal system.  See infra Part II; see also 
infra note 19. 
 5 Assuming the case occurred in 2009, it would be one of 5,360 cases that went to trial 
from 276,397 civil filings.  Judicial Bus. 2010, U.S. District Courts—Civil: Civil Cases Filed, 
by Origin, 2006 Through 2010, U.S. COURTS tbl.S-7 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness2010.aspx; see also 
Judicial Facts & Figures 2010, U.S. District Courts—Combined Civil and Criminal: Civil and 
Criminal Trials Completed, U.S. COURTS tbl.6.4 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/JudicialFactsAndFigures2010.asp
x.  In 2010, only one percent of cases reached trial.  Statistical Tables for the Federal 
Judiciary, U.S. COURTS tbl.C-4 (2010) [hereinafter Table C-4], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2010/dec
10/C04 Dec10.pdf. 
 6 In 2009, the average length of a civil suit before going to trial was 24.8 months.  This 
statistic assumes the case did not fall within the 11.7 percent of cases over three years old, or 
36,829 cases.  Fed. Court Mgmt. Statistics, U.S. District Court—Judicial Caseload Profile, 
U.S. COURTS (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-
bin/cmsd2010Sep.pl.  
 7 FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., FULBRIGHT’S 6TH ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY 
REPORT (2009).  Approximately 38 percent of midsize companies spent at least one million 
dollars on civil litigation.  The same study found that 13 percent of small companies spent at 
least $1 million annually in litigation costs (the number was 4 percent in 2007).  The largest 
companies had a much smaller increase in companies spending at least $1 million annually as 
the percentage grew from 75 percent in 2007 to 78 percent in 2009.  Id.  
 8 See Hess, Parker & Toufanian, infra note 59. 
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rendering that trial meritless.  In reaching any of those stages, the adversely affected 
party more than likely devoted unnecessary time, resources, and finances in the case.  
Additionally, the parties are often unable to predict success when making a petition 
or appeal.  Under the current system, the court does not provide any explanation to 
the party regarding the reasons the petition was denied.  Instead, the system relies 
upon a broad set of confusing criteria to qualify for a grant of an interlocutory appeal 
without requiring any explanation to accompany the decision.9 
The unfairness and confusion created by the current interlocutory appeal system 
invites many suggestions for change, including eliminating all appeals.10  While the 
above example briefly demonstrates that this elimination is too drastic,11 it is also 
impractical because historically the appellate process prohibited such an extreme 
change.12  More importantly, this measure is unnecessary.  The state court systems 
offer demonstrative examples of successful techniques that decrease unfairness 
without sacrificing judicial efficiency.  Thus, there is no reason to eliminate, or even 
create, a completely new appellate system.  Rather, by adopting federalism’s 
historical tenet of “states as laboratories,”13 the interlocutory appeal system can be 
refined. 
Within the paradigm of the scientific method, this Note explains the problems 
with the current interlocutory appellate system and offers accessible techniques 
utilized in the states for its improvement.  In Part II, this Note briefly explains the 
research to outline the historical evolution of the final judgment rule.  While this 
section highlights the benefits of the rule, it also details the rule’s expansion as a 
response to concerns that the federal appellate framework was inefficient, unfair, and 
oftentimes confusing.   
In Part III.A-B., this Note develops its thesis by examining the state court 
systems that are already in place.  These state systems are the “experiments.”  The 
state experiments provide ample evidence of techniques that work and show possible 
problems that may arise before considering its adoption at the federal level.  Then, 
this Note argues that combining the strongest techniques employed at the state level 
would improve efficiency and fairness14 at the federal level, while maintaining the 
balance between the court and parties’ interests. 
Part III.C. extends the analysis to demonstrate the need to require written 
opinions to accompany decisions.  Such a requirement would help to facilitate 
changes to the federal interlocutory appeal system.  Not only do written opinions 
balance efficiency and fairness between the court and parties, but mandated opinions 
could also bring insight and clarity to a confusing process.  Thus, like the state 
                                                           
 9 See infra Part IV. 
 10 See Carelton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE. L. J. 539, 
560-63 (1932) (stating “the concept of the final judgment is wholly unsatisfactory as a method 
of” restricting appeals.”). 
 11 For an explanation on why appeals are beneficial, see Robertson, infra note 89.  
 12 See infra Part III.  
 13 See, e.g., New State Ice, Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 14 Fairness applies to both the judges and the parties. 
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experiments, written opinions would offer evidence of any problems and any trends 
within the courts that could guide future procedural changes. 
II.  THE RESEARCH: THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS PROCESS WITHIN THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 
A.  The Evolution of the Final Judgment Rule 
The right to appeal has become a central tenet of American law.  The right is 
“sacrosanct,”15 and credited with improving the federal courts’ “ability to administer 
justice in a regular, evenhanded, and confidence-inspiring manner.”16  Generally, the 
right to appeal may only be exercised after the trial court renders a final decision.17  
Such timing is a prerequisite for exercising the right to appeal.  Some version of this 
finality requirement has existed in the United States since 1789.18  The United States 
Congress adopted the English common law,19 and later codified the requirement in 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.20  
The finality requirement is not unwarranted.  Rather, the final judgment rule 
exists to serve at least four purposes for the various groups involved.21  First, the rule 
guards against the interruption of court proceedings by allowing an organized court 
record to fully develop before review.22  
                                                           
 15 Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L. 
J. 62, 64 (1985) (questioning the desirability of appeals and offers proposals that the appeals 
be limited to certain categories of cases). 
 16 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on 
Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 712 (1999) (exploring the 
history of the federal courts and attempting to explain the growing interest in the structure and 
development of the lower courts). 
 17 See Laura C. Baucus, How Long Should Bad Attorneys Have to Wait? The Immediate 
Appeal of Attorney Sanctions Under the Collateral Order Doctrine, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 289, 
290 (2000). 
 18 Specifically, the rule was embodied in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 
73, 84. 
 19 Presented in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the rule developed from English common law. 
The appellate court was required to take the entire record under consideration, thereby making 
appeals before a final decision problematic since the King’s Bench and the trial court could 
not review the record simultaneously.  See Gerald T. Wetherington, Appellate Review of Final 
and Non-Final Orders in Florida Civil Cases—An Overview, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 
Summer 1984, at 61-62. 
 20 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1948) (declaring that the federal appellate courts only have 
jurisdiction “from all final decisions of the district courts”); see also Midland Asphalt Corp. v. 
United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989) (discussing the history of 28 U.S.C. § 1291). 
 21 See, e.g., Robert Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right 
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993). Professor Martinaeu noted the rule 
“serves the purposes of some or most parties and prospective parties, their lawyers, the trial 
court, the appellate court, and ultimately the public.”  Id. at 771. 
 22 See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (“[I]mmediate review 
of every trial court ruling, while permitting more prompt correction of erroneous decisions, 
would impose unreasonable disruption, delay, and expense.”). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss1/10
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Second, prohibiting non-final appeals prevents piecemeal adjudication,23 thus 
reducing delays for the parties and courts.24  Throughout early American history, 
courts sought to avoid piecemeal adjudication by imposing the finality requirement 
as a mechanism for preventing delays.25  In 1830, Justice Story praised the restriction 
as a method for discouraging successive appeals, which could “occasion very great 
delays and oppressive expenses.”26  Likewise, Chief Justice Marshall inferred that 
Congress intended the final judgment rule be used to avoid “all the delays and 
expense incident to a repeated revision” of successive appeals on a single issue.27   
Third, the rule reduces “encroach[ment] upon the prerogatives of district court 
judges.”28  District court judges can freely exercise their discretion when making a 
decision without repeated interruption by a second court.  This approach thus 
preserves the respect and independence owed to trial judges as the initial 
adjudicators.29  For instance, if a trial judge’s ruling could be challenged instantly on 
a whim, the judge’s authority and function could be significantly undermined.30  
Fourth, the final judgment rule is believed to promote an efficient judicial 
system.31  The rule prevents parties from using the appeals process to harass 
opponents, particularly wealthy parties filing separate appeals as a strategy to drain 
the opposition’s financial resources.32  Further, lawyers are able to litigate cases 
economically, without needless appeals that serve no purpose but to appease the 
                                                           
 23 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).  
 24 See Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 472 U.S. at 430 (stating that the final judgment rule 
avoids the delays that appellate interruptions would cause). 
 25 See, e.g., Rutherford v. Fisher, 4 U.S. (4. Dall.) 22 (1800) (holding an order denying the 
statute of limitations defense is not appealable); see also Canter v. Am. Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 
Pet.) 307, 310 (1830) (holding that the question of whether damages may or may not be 
assessed at all was not appealable); Martineau, supra note 21. 
 26 Canter, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 430 (holding that damages for interlocutory appeals were 
interlocutory and thus not appealable). 
 27 United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 267, 268-69 (1835). 
 28 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009) (quoting Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 374; see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 472 U.S. at 430 (“It would 
also undermine the ability of district judges to supervise litigation.”). 
 29 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 374 (“Permitting piecemeal appeals would 
undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual 
plays in our judicial system.”); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 
(1974) (the final judgment rule “prevents the debilitating effect on judicial administration 
caused by piecemeal appellate disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single 
controversy.”). 
 30 Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 472 U.S. at 430. 
 31 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3907 (1992). 
 32 John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with 
Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L. J. 200, 203 (1994). 
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client.33  The final judgment rule effectuates these policies by precluding appellate 
review of most interlocutory rulings.34 
B.  Problems with the Final Judgment Rule 
The final judgment rule effectively promotes the above policies, but the strict and 
limited application of the rule has significant drawbacks.35  Chiefly, a trial court’s 
decisions may have “serious and continuous effects”36 on litigation that cannot be 
restored if the appeal is delayed, whereas an immediate appeal could shorten, 
streamline, or even end litigation.  For instance, there has been greater emphasis on 
the importance of pretrial case management.37  With increased pretrial rulings, strict 
adherence to the final judgment rule could advance what may turn out to be a 
potentially meritless trial.38  This is especially problematic given the increased 
emphasis on pretrial activity.  In a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, 
several attorneys reported that since Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly39 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal,40 there has been an increase in the number of motions filed, without an 
increase in the likelihood that the motion would be granted.41  Thus, attorneys face 
                                                           
 33 See also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, at 279. 
 34 See Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and 
Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 542 (“[T]he general run of pretrial 
orders—denials of motions to dismiss, discovery orders, joinder decisions, denial of summary 
judgment, scheduling orders, and so on—cannot be appealed until the case is over.”). 
 35 Margaret L. Anderson, The Immediate Appealability of Rule 11 Sanctions, 59 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 683, 689 (1991) (“[A]lthough the final judgment rule has been an effective 
means of promoting these policies, courts also recognize that the rule can lead to harsh 
results.”). 
 36 S. Christian Mullgarat, Settlement Agreements and the Collateral Order Doctrine: A 
Step in the Wrong Direction?, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 158 (1995) (citing R. STERN, 
APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 79 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 37 See Adam Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1241 
(citing Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1265–66 (2005)). 
 38 In 2010, 314,233 civil cases were filed with 229,448 terminated during the pretrial 
phase.  Table C-4, supra note 5. 
 39 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 40 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 622 (2009).  It is this author’s belief that the pleading 
standards arising out of Twombly and Iqbal are the most recent developments in civil litigation 
that would have an impact on the pretrial stage, and thus on the number of interlocutory 
orders. 
 41 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGIG, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS: 
ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 1–2 (Mar. 
2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/%20lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file/cost 
civ3.pdf (“To supplement the multivariate analysis, . . . the Center . . . interview[ed] a number 
of the attorneys who responded to the case-based survey. . . . This report documents those 
interviews, organizing them where possible to track the results of the multivariate analyses.”). 
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States asked 
the Federal Judicial Center to conduct a study on the costs of federal civil litigation.  EMERY 
G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGIG, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES: 
 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss1/10
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increased costs due to increased pretrial filings in addition to the rising costs incurred 
in litigation. 
Even when the delay of appellate review is not a threat, strict adherence to the 
finality requirement can drain both the courts’ and the parties’ time and financial 
resources.  In the same study mentioned above, the attorneys reported that the 
additional pretrial activity increased the costs of litigating their cases.42  Thus, when 
an erroneous trial court ruling on a pretrial motion cannot be immediately 
corrected,43 the parties may be forced to waste additional time and money on a 
meritless trial after investing such resources in increased pretrial activities.44   
C.  Attempts to Reduce the Harshness of the Final Judgment Rule 
1.  A Statutory Expansion: 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)45 
Recognition of these drawbacks led Congress and the Court to create exceptions 
to the finality requirement.46  Both branches found that an opportunity to appeal from 
a non-final order may “prevent irreparable harm to a party, advance the termination 
of the litigation, or serve some broader public interest, [so] there have been constant 
efforts to make exceptions to the finality requirement.”47 
The first significant change expanded 28 U.S.C. § 1292.48  In expanding the 
statute, Congress sought to curtail inefficiency and injustice caused by a strict 
                                                           
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RULES 2-4 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ 
costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf.   In 2009, the Center conducted a survey of a random sample 
of attorneys that were involved cases that were terminated in the last quarter of 2008.  The 
Center supplemented this survey with interviews of some of the responding attorneys.  “This 
report, prepared for the Committee’s March 2010 meeting, presents multivariate analysis of 
litigation costs in the closed cases.”  Id.; see also JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL vii (Mar. 2011), available 
at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf. nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf (finding that 
“[t]here was a general increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate of filing of motions to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim . . . [but] no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss”). 
 42 LEE & WILLIG, supra note 41.  While the study did not report costs, it is plausible that 
increased filings would increase the costs of litigation.  This is an assumption by the author. 
 43 See Anderson, supra note 35. 
 44 Baucus, supra note 17, at 295. 
 45 Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2012). 
 46 There are a number of other statutory exceptions to the finality requirement not 
discussed in this paper.  The statutory exceptions to section 1291 include sections 1291(a)(2) 
and (3), which permit appeals from an interlocutory order “appointing receivers, or refusing 
orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof” and allow 
non-final appeals in admiralty cases.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1291(a)(2)-3) (West 2012). The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure also provide an appeal through writs of mandamus and certification 
of partial final judgments under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 47 Martineau, supra note 21, at 788; see also Pierre H. Bergeron, A New Vision of 
Appellate Jurisdiction Over Orders Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L. J. 1365, 1369 
(2002) (“[I]interlocutory review is largely unavailable in a significant number of cases in 
which it should be appropriate.”). 
 48 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2012). 
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adherence to the final judgment rule.49  Initially, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States proposed a statute that would have granted interlocutory appeals by 
permission of the court of appeals that were “necessary or desirable to avoid 
substantial injustice.”50  But, this language was strongly opposed.51  Once Congress 
struck that language, the amendment immediately became codified as 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b).52  
Congress and the courts viewed this addition as an effort to “improve and 
expedite the administration of justice in the courts.”53  The new subsection permits 
an early appeal of limited types of interlocutory orders.  Specifically, the district 
court may54 certify an order “involv[ing] a controlling question of law as to which 
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal 
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”55  
Once a district court certifies the order, the appellate court exercises its discretion 
                                                           
 49 James P. Weygandt, Motions for Appointment of Counsel and the Collateral Order 
Doctrine, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1547, 1550 (1985); see also Martineau, supra note 21, at 788 (a 
non-final order sometimes “would prevent irreparable harm to a party, advance the 
termination of litigation, or serve some broader public interest, [so] there have been constant 
efforts to make exceptions to the finality requirement to allow early appeals in some cases.”). 
 50 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF SPECIAL SESSION 
FOR THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 203 (Mar. 20-21, 1952). 
 51 The grounds for the objections were not stated in the report; however, another author 
offers a compelling suggestion stating that it was “likely that objections were raised to the 
procedure for direct application to the courts of appeals and to the breadth of the standard 
controlling review.”  Such objections were raised in the “debate” between Judge Frank and 
Chief Judge Charles E. Clark that was carried on in the Second Circuit for some fifteen years 
before the action of the Judicial Conference.  Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal 
Courts Under 28 USC Section 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607, 610 n.13 (1975) (referencing 
Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621, 627 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.) and Zalkind 
v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 907-08; n.5 (2d Cir. 1943) (Clark, J., dissenting)). 
 52 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2012). 
 53 H.R. Res. 6238, 85th Cong. (1st Sess. 1957) (testimony of Chief Judge Parker of the 
Fourth Circuit at the House Committee on the Judiciary on February 26, 1958).  The Judicial 
Conference of the United States viewed the bill as a compromise between those who did not 
want any expansion of interlocutory appeals and those who did.  See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, 
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 713-16 (4th ed. 1983); see also H.R. REP. NO. 85-1667, at 1 
(1958) (stating the purpose of section 1292(b) was “to expedite the ultimate termination of 
litigation and thereby save unnecessary expense and delay” by allowing appeal of certain non-
final orders).  Id. 
 54 The judge uses her discretion whether to grant or deny the petition for an interlocutory 
appeal.  See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). 
 55 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2012).  The “controlling question of law” standard has 
generally been held to “encompass at the very least every order which, if erroneous, would be 
reversible error on final appeal.”  Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir. 
1975).  But as this Note explains, even if a dispute satisfies the criteria, there is no guarantee 
the petition will be granted.  
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss1/10
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whether to permit the appeal.56  Thus, for an appeal under section 1292(b) to be 
heard, both the district court and the appellate court must agree to the appeal. 
By its terms, section 1292(b) is a limited exception to the final judgment rule.  
The plain language of section 1292(b) narrowly restricts its applications to a few 
limited circumstances, and the courts have refused to apply the statute broadly.57  
Particularly, courts interpreted section 1292(b) to be used “sparingly,” with most 
circuits restricting its application to “exceptional” or “big” cases.58  Between 1995 
and 2010, 117 petitions were filed pursuant to section 1292(b) in the Federal Circuit, 
but only thirty-four percent were granted.59  Even more significant is that the 
Supreme Court has expressly stated that an appellate court may refuse to hear a 
section 1292(b) appeal “for any reason, including docket congestion,”60 regardless of 
whether the petition met the criteria of section 1292(b).  Hence, the consequences are 
that the statutory exception is (1) not often used and (2) when used, is not often 
successful.61  
                                                           
 56 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2012).  The Court of Appeals “may refuse to entertain 
such an appeal in much the same manner that the Supreme Court today refuses to entertain 
application for writs of certiorari.”  S. REP. NO. 85-2434 (1958), reprinted in 1958 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5257. 
 57 Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1171-74, 1193-96 (1990). 
 58 See, e.g., Milbert v. Bison Labs., Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 435 (3d Cir. 1958) (declaring that 
“Congress intended that section 1292(b) should be sparingly applied.  It is to be used only in 
exceptional cases where an intermediate appeal may avoid protracted and expensive litigation 
and is not intended to open the floodgates to a vast number of appeals”); Bobolakis v. 
Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, 168 F. Supp. 236, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) 
(stating “it is clear that this legislation was aimed at the ‘big’ and expensive case where an 
unusual amount of time and money may be expended in the pre-trial phases of the case or 
where the trial itself is likely to be long and costly.”); S. REP. NO. 85-2434, at 5259 (1958) 
(“[A]ppeals under this legislation should only be used in exceptional cases where an 
intermediate appeal may avoid protracted and expensive legislation and is not to be used or 
granted in ordinary litigation where the issues raised can otherwise be properly disposed of.”). 
 59 Alexandra B. Hess, Stephanie L. Parker & Tala K. Toufanian, Permissive Interlocutory 
Appeals at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (1995-2010), 
60 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 764 (2011). 
 60 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978).  Additionally, interlocutory 
appeals were only to be authorized to avoid “protracted and expensive litigation.”  Paschall v. 
Kan. City Star Co., 605 F.2d 403, 406 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Kraus v. Bd. of Cnty. Road 
Comm’rs, 364 F.2d 919, 922 (6th Cir. 1966) (Section 1292(b) “was not intended to authorize 
interlocutory appeals in ordinary suits for personal injuries or wrongful death that can be tried 
and disposed of on their merits in a few days.”).  The same view dates back to the original 
codification of the final judgment rule in Milbert, 260 F.2d at 433. 
 61 In the early years of section 1292(b), the Annual Reports of the Director of the 
Administrative Office of the United States Court suggested that applications to the court of 
appeals pursuant to section 1292(b) were made in approximately one-hundred cases per year.  
Roughly half of these applications were granted.  Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 51, at 607 
n.5.  The statistics do not reveal the behavior of the district courts.  Id.  In the Seventh Circuit: 
“Since the beginning of 1999, this court has received 31 petitions for interlocutory appeal 
under . . . § 1292(b) and has granted only six of them.”  Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of 
Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000).  A majority of the denials were “for jurisdictional 
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2.  A Judicially Created Exception to the Final Judgment Rule: The Collateral Order 
Doctrine62 
The judicial branch also created an exception to the final judgment rule known as 
the collateral order doctrine.  The Court first developed the collateral order doctrine 
in 1949 in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation.63  There, the Court 
identified the existence of a “small class” of interlocutory orders that could be 
immediately appealable.64  Specifically, the Court explained that this “small class” 
regarded “claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the 
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to 
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is 
adjudicated.”65  For nearly two decades the courts of appeals liberally applied the 
collateral order doctrine.66   
Eventually, the Supreme Court limited the collateral order doctrine’s 
applicability. Consistent with 28 U.S.C § 1292’s limited application, the collateral 
order doctrine has also been applied in narrow circumstances.67  To qualify within 
the “small class” of claims permitted by Cohen’s collateral order doctrine, the Court 
in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay established that an immediate appeal under Cohen 
must: 
(1) Conclusively determine the disputed question; 
(2) Resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action; and  
                                                           
reasons.”  Id.  Additionally in the Second Circuit: “§ 1292(b) has not caused a large problem 
in the federal appellate court. . . .  The public record of the Second Circuit for the years 1994 
and 1995 reveals a total for the two years of 35 motions for leave to appeal under § 1292(b), 
of which only eight were granted.”  Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 101 F.3d 863, 866 (2d 
Cir. 1996). 
 62 Besides the collateral order doctrine, the other judicially created exceptions pertain to 
property.  See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).  These exceptions are rarely 
used, but are discussed in 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3929 (2d ed.) (West 2011). 
 63 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 543 (1949).  In Cohen, a plaintiff 
brought a stockholder’s derivative action under diversity jurisdiction.  Id.  The district court 
judge refused to apply a state law that required the plaintiff to first file a security bond where 
the plaintiff held less than five percent of the total stock outstanding.  The order was not final, 
thus the plaintiff’s case could proceed.  Id. at 545.  But, the Court found the order appealable, 
resolving an issue collateral to the merits of the case.  Id. at 546-47.  
 64 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Martineau, supra note 21, at 740.  During the twenty year period, few orders did not 
qualify as appealable under the Cohen opinion.  Id. 
 67 The Court held that the collateral order doctrine “is best understood not as an exception 
to the ‘final decision’ rule laid down by Congress in § 1291, but as a ‘practical construction’ 
of it.”  Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994); see also 
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916-17 (1997) (holding that Cohen was the source for an 
expanded “definition” of the term “final decision”). 
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(3) Be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.68   
Over the years, the doctrine’s application to a “small class” of decisions eroded.69  
The collateral order doctrine now permits an immediate appeal of a wide-array of 
non-final orders.70  Broadening the doctrine’s application may have improved a 
party’s situation, but it resulted in inconsistencies among the circuit courts.  The 
circuits differ on defining and determining the types of interlocutory orders that 
qualify within the doctrine’s scope.  For instance, courts differ upon the role of 
“importance” in the application of the collateral order doctrine.  The D.C. Circuit 
and Third Circuit define Cohen “separability” as imposing a requirement that the 
appeal must be “important.”71  In contrast, the Fourth Circuit does not even reference 
“importance” in its analysis of collateral order decisions.72  Additionally, courts are 
split on the application of “unreviewability.”  The First and Seventh circuits require 
the presence of “irreparable harm” as the basis for jurisdiction,73 whereas the Sixth, 
Tenth, and sometimes the First and Seventh Circuits require that rights be 
irretrievably lost before an order can qualify as collateral.74  Such ambiguity in the 
                                                           
 68 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
 69 The Supreme Court still uses language of the “small class” to define the appealability of 
an interlocutory order.  See Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) 
(stating “[t]hat small category includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve 
important questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from the final judgment in the underlying action.”).  It is my opinion that the “small class” is 
merely a term of art because the “class” has since enlarged.  Moreover, the phrase serves to 
sustain the Court’s support of the final judgment rule and its belief that the collateral order 
doctrine “never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single 
appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.”  Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. 
Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (citing Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868 (citation 
omitted); see also Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006) (“emphasizing [the doctrine’s] 
modest scope”). 
 70 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985) (holding that the doctrine permits the 
immediate appeal of pretrial orders denying the qualified immunity defense advanced by a 
defendant in a civil rights action); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974) 
(finding that the doctrine applies to orders in a class action dispute where the defendant 
assumes the costs of notice).  Although this Note is limited to civil cases, the same narrow 
application of the Cohen doctrine is true in criminal cases.  See, e.g., Midland Asphalt Corp. v. 
United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (stating that the Cohen doctrine is to be interpreted 
“with the utmost strictness”) (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984)). 
 71 Separability is defined where “an issue is important if the interests that would 
potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that issue are significant 
relative to efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.”  
United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing In re Ford 
Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
 72 See Under Seal v. Under Seal, 326 F.3d 479, 481 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 73 See Kristin B. Gerdy, “Important” and “Irreversible” but Maybe Not “Unreviewable”: 
The Dilemma of Protecting Defendants’ Rights Through the Collateral Order Doctrine, 38 
U.S.F. L. REV. 213, 236-37 (2004). 
 74 Id. 
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manner the doctrine is applied results in confusion.  Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court has resolved and clarified only a handful of these circuit splits.75 
3.  Other Exceptions to the Final Judgment Rule76  
The Supreme Court also recognizes two exceptions to the final judgment rule 
within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The first, codified in Rule 54(b), is 
invoked in cases involving multiple claims or parties.77  Under this rule, a district 
court judge may directly enter a judgment for one or more, but less than all, of the 
claims or parties if the judge makes an express determination that there is no just 
reason to delay entry.78  This judgment may be immediately appealed.79 
On its face, Rule 54(b) appears to violate the definition of “final decision” 
because it permits early judgment on any claim.  The Court explained that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow joinder of claims and parties, which “in turn, 
demonstrate[s] a need for relaxing the restriction upon what should be treated as a 
judicial unit for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.”80  This judicial unit concept “was 
developed from the common law which had dealt with litigation generally less 
complicated than much of that today.”81  Accordingly, Rule 54(b)’s relaxation on 
finality is limited to cases involving multiple claims and thus does not directly 
contradict the final judgment rule. 
The second exception is embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).82  
Before its amendment in 1998, interlocutory review of class certification was subject 
to the same stringent requirements and restraints of the final judgment rule.83  Today, 
Rule 23(f) provides: 
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of 
a district court granting or denying class action certification under this 
rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An 
                                                           
 75 See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 603 (holding that disclosure orders adverse 
to attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order 
doctrine); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 624 (2009) (allowing interlocutory 
appeal to a non-signatory seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement). 
 76 While this Note only discusses the statutory exception to the final judgment rule in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, another statutory exception is the writ of mandamus as 
defined by federal statute.  28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).  The statute permits interlocutory review 
only in “extraordinary” circumstances.  See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1967) 
(explaining the statute’s restrictive application). 
 77 FED R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1956).  If the party does not 
immediately appeal this judgment, then it may not be appealed when the judgment disposing 
of all remaining claims is entered.  See, e.g., Martineau, supra note 21, at 737. 
 80 Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 351 U.S. at 432. 
 81 Id. 
 82 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 83 Solimine, supra note 57, at 1535-36. 
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appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district 
judge or the court of appeals so orders it.84 
Under this rule, the authority to allow an immediate appeal shifts from the 
district court to the appellate court.  The rule differs from section 1292(b), which 
requires a party to seek permission to appeal from the district court.85  The Advisory 
Committee viewed this departure as a way to “make appeals more readily 
available.”86  But like the other exceptions, permission for an interlocutory appeal 
under Rule 23(f) will “rarely be given,”87 thus perpetuating inefficiency and 
unfairness under the current federal system. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
The ultimate goal of the appellate system is to “expedite the disposition of 
interlocutory rulings in which timeliness is essential.”88  In theory, appellate review 
provides: (1) uniform results; (2) higher probabilities of correct judgment; and (3) 
increased belief that a party’s dispute has been fully and fairly heard.89  In practice, 
the result is the opposite.90 
Commentators suggest solutions to the problems of the federal interlocutory 
system, including: expanding the statutory list of exceptions;91 permitting more 
interlocutory appeals;92 and making individual exceptions to the final judgment rule 
that permit the immediate appeal of a particular class of orders that the specific 
interlocutory order falls.93  These suggestions are not in practice,94 and thus there is 
                                                           
 84 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 85 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES OF 
NOVEMBER 9-10, 1995 3 (1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/min-cv11.htm. 
 86 Id. at 2. 
 87 Id. at 1. 
 88 Memorandum from Richard Van Duiezend, Principle Court Mgmt. Consultant, Nat’l 
Ctr. for State Courts, Introductory Overview of Massachusetts Single Justice Practice (July 
2008) (on file with author) (summarizing Massachusetts’s single justice procedure), available 
at http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ appellate/id/129. 
 89 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A 
Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 771 (2006); see 
also Dalton, supra note 15, at 62 (“[A]ppellate courts exist to courts exist to correct errors; to 
develop legal principles; and to tie geographically dispersed lower courts into a unified, 
authoritative legal system.”). 
 90 See supra Part II.B. 
 91 Crick, supra note 10, at 563-65.  Crick is an early commentator on the final judgment.  
He suggests that to expand the statutory scheme, the system must abolish the right to appeal 
and the final judgment rule completely.  His ideas are still considered amidst the commentary 
on the federal appellate system, even though this publication is dated before the creation of 
section 1292(b) and the collateral order doctrine. 
 92 Solimine, supra note 57, at 1171-74, 1193-96.    
 93 Martineau, supra note 21, at 729. 
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minimal evidence that such theories would adequately improve the federal appellate 
system. 
A.  The Hypothesis 
This Note does not offer yet another, theoretical proposal; there are plenty of 
valuable ideas that have been tested and implemented at the state level that should be 
examined for federal use.  While most states follow the federal model, some states95 
have developed their own systems in an attempt to reduce the confusion and 
unfairness created under the federal approach.  These state systems often provide the 
necessary supporting evidence of what works and what does not.  For instance, in 
Texas, a petition for an interlocutory appeal could only be made if all the parties and 
the trial court judge agreed.96  Agreement was rare, and within the year of enactment, 
the Texas legislature removed this hurdle.97 
The actual implementation of a method, like in Texas, provides the necessary 
proof that can aid a decision of whether to continue with such an approach or 
possibly adopt another state’s approach.  Every effort may not work, but its 
implementation and adoption from the state level embodies federalism’s classic, 
central tenet: “states as laboratories”98 in which hypotheses are tested and results 
evaluated.  It is from these results at the state level that a federal system can 
effectively and efficiently develop. 
B.  The Experiments 
1.  New York: The All-Appeal System 
Making appeals more accessible lessens the resulting unfairness caused by the 
federal interlocutory appeals system.  This result is evidenced by the approach taken 
in New York.  On the spectrum of what is appealable, New York is the most 
generous.99  New York procedural law permits a petition for interlocutory appeal of 
any non-final order regarding legal disputes.100  The rationale behind this liberal 
approach helps a party avoid irreparable damage, such as unnecessary costs in 
                                                           
 94 While New York and Massachusetts permit all interlocutory appeals, there is little 
commentary that references the two states to support this theory. 
 95 These states include Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.  See David Scheffel, Interlocutory Appeals in New York—
Time has Come for a More Efficient Approach, 16 PACE L. REV. 607 (1996). 
 96 Ryan Brannan, Returning Justice to the Judicial System: Procedural Protections from 
Frivolous Litigation, TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND. POLICYPERSPECTIVE, Apr. 14, 2011, at 1, 
available at http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2011-04-PP03-LosersPays-rb.pdf. 
 97 The change occurred on September 1, 2011.  See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 51.014 (West 2011). 
 98 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280-81 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 99 Scheffel, supra note 95, at 613-19 (“New York [is] one of the most liberal jurisdictions 
in the United States,” allowing a party to appeal, “by right, almost any civil interlocutory 
order.”); see also La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 268 (1957) (citing New York 
as an extreme example for allowing review by right of almost any order). 
 100 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5701 (McKinney 2011). 
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continuing with meritless litigation.101  Additionally, New York’s reasons for 
adopting this system attempt to avoid some of the federal system’s most common 
critiques.102 
According to the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA), the rigid federal 
model “was not . . . a promising one for New York to follow.”103  Primarily, the 
NYSBA argued that the federal model allowed too few certifications for appeal.104  
This limitation imposed a risk of irreparable harm because the adversely affected 
party could face an unnecessary trial.105  Instead, the New York approach increases 
fairness for a party seeking an appeal.  This is because all interlocutory issues are 
appealable.106   
Another benefit of the all-appeal approach is improved efficiency within the 
courts.  The opportunity to immediately appeal increases efficiency because it 
reduces both the risk of a useless trial by providing a quick avenue for error 
correction and the amount of time, resources, and money a party would spend in 
continuing litigation.107 
While the New York approach is advantageous to the parties,108 a main concern 
is that it risks unduly burdening the courts.  More opportunities to appeal increase a 
                                                           
 101 See supra Part II. 
 102 See supra Part II.B; see also infra notes 103-105. 
 103 Ellen B. Fishman, State Bar Recognizes Importance of Interlocutory Appeals, 2 
LEAVEWORTHY 2, 3 (Summer 2011) [hereinafter NYSBA Report] (New York State Bar 
Association (NYSBA) Committee on Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction) (newsletter describing 
a study by the NYSBA and Civil Practice Law and Rules’ Committees on New York’s system 
of interlocutory appeals); see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N (NYSBA) COMM. ON CIVIL 
PRACTICE LAW & RULES & COMM. ON COURTS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION, REPORT ON 
INTERLOCUTORY CIVIL APPEALS IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS (Oct. 2010) (report on 
Interlocutory Civil Appeals in New York State Courts opining that “a broad right to take 
interlocutory appeals, should be maintained.”). 
 104 NYSBA Report, supra note 103.  
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
“For instance, summary judgment is not infrequently granted on appeal in whole or 
part, thus saving the parties and the court system from a wholly unnecessary trial on 
some or all of the issues in the case. Likewise, if an order compelling disclosure of a 
key piece of evidence is upheld on appeal, that may well encourage the parties to 
reach a settlement disposing of the matter entirely.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 107 See id.  
 108 Granted, it is more advantageous for the party seeking an appeal; however, the other 
party would still benefit in the cost-reduction and the time saved with the interlocutory appeal, 
especially when litigation costs are on the rise.  LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF 
MAJOR COMPANIES 3-4 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd 
Policies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Litigation%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%2
0Companies.pdf. 
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burgeoning caseload docket, which critics109 argue imposes an additional burden 
upon the court.  Along with docket congestion, the ability to immediately appeal any 
matter may interrupt, and thus interfere, with the trial court process.  As a result, 
delays may occur that could also burden the court.110   
Those burdens, however, are slight.  First, according to NYSBA the current 
caseload congestion in New York is not the product of interlocutory appeals.111  The 
largest portion of the appellate docket consists of non-interlocutory appeals.112  
Second, when a party makes a petition for an interlocutory appeal, the court’s 
decision is based upon a minimally developed record.  These decisions concern few 
questions of law and leave the factual disputes undisturbed.113  Limiting decisions to 
fewer legal issues requires shorter appellate opinions, reducing the burden on the 
court.114  Thus, adopting an all-appeal system grants parties a fair opportunity to 
avoid unnecessary litigation without reducing the efficiency of the courts. 
Critics have also argued that the New York approach “may lead to excessive 
appellate intrusion, demoralizing the trial judge.”115  Allowing every order to be 
appealable without a valid reason is potentially disrespectful to the trial judge.  This 
“encroach[ment] upon the prerogatives of district court judges” is one reason why 
Congress and the Court sought to prohibit non-final appeals.116 
This argument is flawed for two reasons.  First, the court has a purpose to 
administer justice.  This purpose supersedes any “encroachment.”  Judges are sworn, 
under oath, “to do right to all manner of people” whose administrative purpose is to 
maintain right, to uphold justice, to protect rights, and “to redress wrongs.”117  Often, 
these judges sit on courts that will in some instances function as error-correcting 
                                                           
 109 See Scheffel, supra note 95, at 608 (arguing that because New York is facing a caseload 
crisis, the all-appeal process must be reevaluated to improve the situation).   
 110 ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK 87 (1982) (stating 
interlocutory appeals take up a significant amount of the appellate courts’ caseload and they 
are often used as a delay tactic disrupting the trial process). 
 111 NYSBA Report, supra note 103.  
 112 Id. at 2-3. 
 113 Another supporting argument by NYSBA is that an interlocutory appeal is also taken 
without an oral argument, decreasing the potential for a burdened court.  Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Scheffel, supra note 95, at 608; see also Jill Paradise Botler et al., The Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of New York: An Empirical Study of its Powers and Functions 
as an Intermediate State Court, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 929, 954 (1979) (stating “free 
appealability affords the Appellate Division substantial opportunity to supervise the trial court 
and to ensure that its actions are within permissible legal and discretionary bounds.”). 
 116 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009) (quoting Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)); see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 
472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (“It would also undermine the ability of district judges to supervise 
litigation.”). 
 117 SIR JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE: OR THE THEORY OF THE LAW 13 (1907).  
For further discussion of the error-correcting function of the appellate courts, see Steven 
Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUDIES 379 
(1995). 
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bodies.118  For instance, the NYSBA found several “incidence[s] of modification or 
reversal of orders by the Appellate Division”119 demonstrating this error-correcting 
function within its state system.  Given the court’s purpose and judge’s oath, this 
error-correcting component should not be avoided for fear of treading upon the 
judge’s feelings.  Second, the district court judge maintains authority over the merits 
of case even when a party makes a petition.  While an appeal pends, the party must 
seek permission to stay the underlying case.120  Such stays are rarely granted, thus 
the case continues under that judge minimizing any “encroachment” or interruption 
of adjudication.121 
2.  Massachusetts: The All-Appeal System Under a Single Justice 
By making interlocutory appeals more accessible, we must make efforts to 
reduce the potential burden from increased litigation on the courts.  One example of 
such effort is in Massachusetts.  Massachusetts adopts the same generous standard as 
New York in permitting petitions to appeal for all non-final orders.122  Yet, 
Massachusetts has a unique approach to the interlocutory appeal procedure.  Appeals 
are permitted through the discretion of a separate, designated justice at the state 
appellate level.123  The justice considers all petitions for review.124  This system gives 
the single justice the same power as a full bench, but the interlocutory appeals exist 
entirely on a separate docket.  The separate bench and docket conserves the appellate 
division’s resources because plenary appellate review is avoided and a judge’s 
docket is not inundated with interlocutory appeal petitions.125 
The sole justice has broad discretion to decide whether to grant the petition for an 
appeal, which invokes criticism.126  Under this system, no other justice provides a 
                                                           
 118 Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 13 (1988) (Marshall J., dissenting) (acknowledging 
the error-correcting function of the Supreme Court); Irving v. United States, 162 F. 3d 154, 
161 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining that the en banc court authority “to overrule the decision of a 
prior panel in the same case flows logically from the error-correcting function of the full 
court.”). 
 119 Memorandum from Ellen B. Fishman to Hon. Stephen Crane, Chair, Civil Practice Law 
& Rules Comm., New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) 4 (Sept. 13, 2010) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter NYSBA Memorandum] (citing Bentley Kassal, Update: Did the Appellate 
Odds Change in 2008? Appellate Statistics in State and Federal Courts, N.Y. STATE BAR 
ASS’N J., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 36). 
 120 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5519 (McKinney 2011). 
 121 NYSBA Memorandum, supra note 119, at 2-3. 
 122 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 118 (2011). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Scheffel, supra note 95, at 644.  
 125 See id.  The justices take turns sitting as the sole justice for one month at a time serving 
on a docket separate from full court proceedings.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, §§ 13, 15 
(2011).  
 126 John H. Henn, Civil Interlocutory Appellate Review Under G.L.M. C. 231, § 118 and 
G.L.M. C. 211, § 3, 81 MASS. L. REV. 24, 25 (1996) (“the single justice is given broad 
discretion in deciding whether to grant it.  A single justice has extensive power to grant relief; 
whether he or she will do so is an entirely different matter.”). 
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check on a potentially “dangerous”127 power as generally follows in a plenary 
appellate system.  Additionally, relief from the higher court is rare and invoked only 
“to correct and prevent errors and abuses . . . where no other remedy is expressly 
provided.”128  The decision requires no accompanying rationale, leaving a party in 
the dark as to the reasons for a denial.  Thus, a party faces an extremely unfair 
system—a system that is highly discretionary, with little guidance of what is 
required to achieve an interlocutory appeal, and little relief from the decision.129 
To increase fairness under this model, the solution is simple—require written 
opinions to accompany the decision.130  The “dangerous power” is thereby 
diminished, because the justice could be held responsible for his decision by 
providing reasons for it.131  Such accountability may force the justice to craft a 
thoughtful opinion. 
The simple addition of a written opinion would not burden the single justice 
system, because the system exists on a separate docket where judges rotate terms 
over the docket.  Also, like New York, interlocutory appeals do not make up the 
majority of the Massachusetts appellate docket.132  With limited data as to the filing 
                                                           
 127 Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory 
Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 252-53 (2001). 
 128 Memorandum from Richard Van Duiezend, supra note 88 (describing the purpose of 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3); see also Elizabeth McElaney, A Unique Tool for the 
Massachusetts Practitioner—Single Justice Review of Interlocutory Orders, 15 SUFFOLK J. 
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 233, 234 (2010); see also Thibbitts v. Crowley, 539 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 
n.5 (1989) (stating that interlocutory appeals are not favored). 
 129 The party cannot appeal the justice’s decision to deny a petition for an interlocutory 
appeal.  Thibbitts, 539 N.E.2d at 1037.  
 130 Currently, Massachusetts does not require the justice to write an opinion.  Id.  For 
further discussion as to the benefits of a mandated written opinion, see Part III.C. 
 131 Furthermore, justices for the Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court, each with 
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals with a single justice docket, are appointed by the 
Governor of Massachusetts with the consent of the Governor’s Executive Council.  See MASS. 
CONST. ch. II, sec. I, art. IX (describing the justice selection in Massachusetts).  Both the 
Governor and the Executive Council are elected, and thus there is a political check over the 
justices and the threat of a “dangerous” power is further diminished.  See MASS. CONST. ch. II, 
sec. I, art. II (explaining the process of gubernatorial elections); MASS. CONST. ch. II sec. I 
amend. XVI (amended by MASS. CONST. ch. II, sec. I, art XVI) (stating the council election 
proceedings). 
 132 In 2007, a total of 1,984 cases were entered in the Appeals Court, and an additional 647 
cases were entered in the single justice docket.  The number of entries on the single justice 
docket represented a decrease of 7.2 percent from 2006.  Report of the Appeals Court: 
FY2007, MASS. JUDICIAL BRANCH: MASS. APPEALS COURT, http://www.mass.gov 
/courts/appealscourt/2007-report.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).  In 2008, 2,083 entered the 
Appeals Court, with an additional 597 cases presented to the single justice docket, a decrease 
of 7.7 percent from 2007.  Report of the Appeals Court: FY2008, MASS. JUDICIAL BRANCH: 
MASS. APPEALS COURT, http://www.mass.gov/courts/appealscourt/2008-report.html (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2011); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD 
STATISTICS 2008 (e-mail on file with author) (the National Center has not published the 
statistics for 2009, but they are believed to be forthcoming).  Not all reported entries concern 
interlocutory appeals, demonstrating that the interlocutory appeal, in an all-appeal system, is 
not unduly burdening a court with an exorbitant amount of additional appeals.  See About the 
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rates of interlocutory appeals taken in the federal system, state data offers the 
necessary proof that interlocutory appeals, in an all-appeal system, do not 
automatically burden the court with an influx of cases.133 
Concerns arise that, given the complexity of many federal civil suits, the all-
appeals system would be ineffective.134  However, the federal circuit has significant 
leeway before an all-appeal system would make any impact.  In 2009, the United 
States Court of Appeals concluded a mere 334 applications for interlocutory appeals, 
whereas the termination rate of all appeals reached upwards of 60,508 cases.135  With 
over two hundred times the interlocutory appeal rate, it is likely that increasing 
access to appeals would have a minimal effect on appellate dockets.  However, to 
prepare for the caseload increase, employing a single justice with authority over a 
separate docket would help conserve resources without sacrificing efficiency, as 
demonstrated by Massachusetts. 
                                                           
Court, MASS. JUDICIAL BRANCH: MASS. APPEALS COURT, 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/appealscourt/about-the-court.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) 
(the single justice reviews orders for injunctive relief, “requests for review of summary 
process appeal bonds, certain attorney’s fee awards, motions for stays of civil proceedings or 
criminal sentences pending appeal, and motions to review impoundment orders.”). 
 133 See Robertson, supra note 89, at 773 (Robertson argues that the courts’ workload would 
dramatically increase because she believes all cases involving privilege claims would be 
petitioned for review; however, Robertson fails to offer evidence that those claims would spur 
such an increase). 
 134 Martineau, supra note 21, at 777. 
 135 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES: MULTI-YEAR 
STATISTICAL COMPILATIONS ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S CASELOAD THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 
2009 tbl.2.1 and 2.7 (May 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2009/alljudcialfactsandfigures.pdf.  Even though there is 
no report on the success of such appeals, it is likely safe to presume that the courts continued 
their historical support of the final judgment rule and thus, doubtful many applications were 
even granted. 
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3.  Wisconsin: The Discretionary System136 
Another model emphasizes the discretion of the judge in making the decision to 
grant a petition for review.  This approach is the most commonly offered theory on 
expanding appellate jurisdiction.137  The American Bar Association (ABA) 
promulgated this approach, which Wisconsin adopted and has continued to use for 
the past thirty years.138 
Like the federal system, the Wisconsin method permits appeals of disputes after 
the judgment is formally final.139  However, the Wisconsin system also permits 
petitions for interlocutory appeals if the case qualifies for review under the 
“whenever justice requires” exception in the Wisconsin statute.140  This provision 
authorizes a judge to use broad discretion when reviewing and determining if an 
appeal is warranted.141  The exception effectively eliminates the judicially created 
                                                           
 136 Other states adopt discretionary approaches in their state statutes, but their methods are 
not discussed in this Note.  These include Delaware, DEL. SUP. CT. R. 42 (d)(v) (“[T]his Court 
shall . . . determine in its discretion whether to accept or refuse the interlocutory appeal . . . .  
In exercising that discretion, this Court may consider all relevant factors, including the 
decision of the trial court, whether to certify interlocutory appeal.”); Georgia, GA. SUP. CT. R. 
31 (granting permission to appeal interlocutory order in three instances: “(1) [t]he issue to be 
decided appears to be dispositive of the case; (2) [t]he order appears erroneous and will 
probably cause a substantial error at trial; or (3) [t]he establishment of a precedent is 
desirable.”); Maine, ME. R. RAP. 24(c) (“If the trial court is of the opinion that a question of 
law involved in an interlocutory order or ruling made by it ought to be determined by the Law 
Court before any further proceedings are taken, it may on motion of the aggrieved party report 
the case to the Law Court for that purpose and stay all further proceedings except such as are 
necessary to preserve the rights of the parties without making any decision therein.”); New 
Jersey, N.J. R. 2:2-4 (declaring “the Appellate Division may grant leave to appeal, in the 
interest of justice, from any interlocutory order . . . if the final judgment, decision or action 
thereof is appealable as of right pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a).”); and Washington, WA. RAP. 
2.3(b)(1)-(4) (stating that review will be granted if the lower court: “has committed an obvious 
error which would render further proceedings useless; . . . [or] has committed probable error 
and the decision . . . substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a 
party to act; . . . [or] has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure . . . as to call for review by the appellate 
court; . . . [or] superior court has certified, or that all parties to the litigation have stipulated.”). 
 137 See, e.g., Martineau, supra note 21, at 788; Nagel, supra note 32, at 201. 
 138 Andrew Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1661 (2011). 
 139 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 808.03(1) (West 2011) (providing that “[a] final judgment or final 
order is a judgment or order entered in accordance with sections 806.06(1)(b) or 807.11(2) 
[when it is filed with the office of the clerk of the court]. . . .”). 
 140 Nagel, supra note 32, at 216. 
 141 Wisconsin granted appeals in cases involving double jeopardy (State v. Fischer, No. 90-
2855-CR, 1991 Wis. App. LEXIS 220 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1991)), appointment of counsel 
in a civil contempt action (Brotzman v. Brotzman, 283 N.W.2d 600 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979)), 
jurisdiction over a minor by a juvenile court (G.B.K. v. State, 376 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1985) (minor accused of murder)), a claim that a delinquency petition was untimely (C.A.K. 
v. State, 433 N.W.2d 298 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), aff’d, 453 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1990)), subject-
matter jurisdiction in an insurance dispute (Sipl v. Sentry Indem. Co., 431 N.W.2d 685 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1988)), choice of law (Gavers v. Fed. Life Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. Ct. App. 
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exceptions to the final judgment rule, because all decisions lie within the discretion 
of the judge as opposed to the generic, confusing list of criteria used in the federal 
system.142 
The criteria for discretionary review are whether (1) the termination of the 
proceedings will be materially advanced, (2) the proceedings will be clarified, (3) the 
litigant will suffer substantial or irreparable harm absent appeal, or (4) appeal will 
clarify an issue of general importance.143  This language provides that discretion 
apply on a case-by-case basis.  Although this approach may promote fairness,144 the 
broad language has its drawbacks.  Specifically, relying on four, general criteria 
could lead to the same confusion as the circuits’ application of the collateral order 
doctrine criteria.  Additionally, judges are not required to give a reason for a denial, 
and yet they have the discretion to deny for an unrelated matter.145  The combination 
of the powerful discretion and the lack of an explanation create an unpredictable and 
unfair environment for the parties. 
Despite this drawback, the Wisconsin discretionary approach is a technique that 
can be readily adopted in the federal model and is highly beneficial for purposes of 
judicial efficiency.  First, relying on the discretion of judges eliminates the need to 
create more exceptions where much of the confusion between the circuits lies.  
Second, imposing a discretionary model improves judicial efficiency because it 
reduces judges’ decision-making time.146  Lastly, invoking judicial discretion causes 
                                                           
1984)), refusal to submit to a blood test as civil contempt (State v. A.W.O., 344 N.W.2d 200 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983)), an order compelling testimony of a minor in a child abuse prosecution 
(State v. Gilbert, 326 N.W.2d 744 (Wis. 1982)), constitutionality of judicial substitution 
statutes postponement of hearing on a petition to vacate a street (Selk v. Twp. of Minocqua, 
422 N.W.2d 889 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (court of appeals granted petition to appeal and in turn 
certified case to supreme court)), statutory construction (State v. Holmes, 315 N.W.2d 703 
(Wis. 1982)), disqualification of a party’s attorney, change of venue (Irby v. Young, 407 
N.W.2d 314 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)), and discovery (Vincent & Vincent, Inc. v. Spacek, 306 
N.W.2d 85 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (appeal from order denying a protective order and directing 
party to answer series of written interrogatories)). 
 142 See Part II.C.2. 
 143 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 808.03(2) (West 2011). 
 144 Martineau, supra note 21, at 782. 
 145 Id. at 777. 
 146 See supra note 60.  The judge would avoid the multi-step criteria often required when 
analyzing a petition for interlocutory review.  In an early case, the Fifth Circuit made an astute 
observation on the need for a judge’s discretion: 
[Section 1292(b)] was a judge-sought, judge-made, judge-sponsored enactment.  
Federal Judges from their prior professional practice, and more so from experience 
gained in the adjudication of today’s complex litigation, were acutely aware of two 
principal things.  First, certainty and dispatch in the completion of judicial business 
makes piecemeal appeal as permitted in some states undesirable.  But second, there 
are occasions which defy precise delineation or description in which as a practical 
matter orderly administration is frustrated by the necessity of a waste of precious 
judicial time while the case grinds through to a final judgment as the sole medium 
through which to test the correctness of some isolated identifiable point of fact, of law, 
of substance or procedure, upon which in a realistic way the whole case or defense 
will turn.  The amendment was to give to the appellate machinery of [28 U.S.C.] § 
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little change to the federal system, because the federal system already applies a 
highly discretionary standard for certification of interlocutory appeals.147 
C.  A Long-Term Solution: Mandating Written Opinions 
Adopting the states’ methods will improve fairness and efficiency without 
unduly burdening courts.148  A requirement of a written opinion could shed light on 
any inconsistencies or trends between the circuits.149  For instance, if an exorbitant 
number of judges decide to deny an interlocutory appeal for reasons of case 
congestion, the legislature could seek steps to alleviate this trend.  Additionally, the 
opinions would aid in predicting a party’s chance to prevail while providing the 
information necessary to make an educated decision to petition for an interlocutory 
appeal.  Moreover, if a party decides to petition, an explanation accompanying the 
decision provides a helpful check on the justice as to whether he fairly considered 
the petition without wasting the party’s time and finances.150 
1.  Quantitative Data 
Currently, there is no way to know the exact rationale of the courts, because there 
is no mandatory requirement to draft opinions for decisions involving either section 
1292(b) or the collateral order doctrine.151  All that is required is for the district court 
to provide a minimal statement as to whether the statutory criteria has been 
satisfied.152  The statement need not include the grounds for the judge’s certification, 
and therefore even “cryptic orders have proved effective, even to the point of 
supporting appeal without expressly stating the controlling question.”153  Parties are 
                                                           
1291. . . a considerable flexibility operating under the immediate, sole and broad 
control of Judges so that within reasonable limits disadvantages of piecemeal and final 
judgment appeals might both be avoided. 
Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 147 See Part II.  
 148 See Parts III.A-C.   
 149 Assuming the Wisconsin method is not adopted, the opinions would also give 
information on the manner in which the current federal standards, such as the Cohen criteria, 
are defined.  
 150 The single justice process is also informal, requiring that the aggrieved party file his or 
her petition within thirty days of the issuance of the order.  See Scheffel, supra note 95, at 
624. 
 151 The majority of the state statutes simply mirror the federal model.  Thus, the states 
impose a duty on the district court, when certifying an appeal, to explain their reasonings for 
the appeal.  See, e.g., Town of Fitchburg v. City of Madison, 299 N.W.2d 199, 210 n.4 (Wis. 
1980) (explaining that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin would not review the appellate court’s 
decision to refuse to hear an interlocutory appeal). 
 152 See generally 16 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3930 (2d ed. 1996). 
 153 Id. 
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thus left in the dark as to the reasons for denials and potentially unable to predict the 
petition’s success.154 
Withholding an explanation for a denial diminishes a prime opportunity to see 
the inner workings of the courts, explain judiciary behavior, and collect evidence of 
problems or trends in decisions.  Judge Posner adequately described the difficulty in 
assessing the judiciary’s behavior as “a mystery that is also an embarrassment.”155  
Still, we are dealt with a system where Congress authorized courts to deny an 
application for an interlocutory appeal when, 
[B]ased upon a view that the question involved was not a controlling 
issue.  It could be denied on the basis that the docket of the circuit court of 
appeals was such that the appeal could not be entertained for too long a 
period of time. But, whatever the reason, the ultimate determination 
concerning the right of appeal is within the discretion of the judges of the 
appropriate circuit court of appeals.156 
Such authority may result in a variety of reasons for a denial, or the petition may 
be denied solely because of case congestion.  Unfortunately, there is no way to know 
for certain which it may be.  Absent an explanation, a court of appeals may even 
conclude that the district judge failed to consider the relevant statutory criteria, when 
in fact the judge properly did so. 
Additionally, the federal courts allow judicial discretion on interlocutory appeal 
decisions.  Judges are best suited to make an educated decision, because they know 
their docket and their cases.157  Without a rationale, we are excluded from some of 
the purest data on the court systems. 
2.  Qualitative Data 
Lack of an opinion is just as harmful when a decision to “grant” the petition is 
made.  Currently, the federal model is an “unacceptable morass,”158 “manag[ing] to 
be at once redundant, incomplete, and unclear.”159  The inability to clearly define the 
                                                           
 154 An argument can be raised that a petitioner could assess the success rate because most 
petitions for interlocutory appeal are denied.  See Part II.  However, as circuit splits go 
unresolved, the rising confusion regarding the differing criteria could cause difficulty in 
predicting outcomes or potentially force a party to change strategy in selecting the forum. This 
is an assumption by the author. 
 155 Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 10 (1993). 
 156 S. REP NO 85-2434 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5257. 
 157 These judges are the most knowledgeable on the issue because they were the authority 
over the record.  See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985) (“[T]he 
district judge can better exercise [his or her] responsibility [to police the prejudgment tactics 
of litigants] if the appellate courts do not repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudgment 
rulings.”). 
 158 Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, 47 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 172 (1984). 
 159 Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986). 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
282 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:259 
 
exceptions has produced widespread dissatisfaction.160  The need for clarification is 
extremely important given the current state of litigation.161  Specifically, written 
opinions would offer insight into circuit splits or specific cases that are often granted 
for interlocutory review.  Such information could aid the legislature in enacting new 
guidelines for interlocutory review, or help both the legislature and the Court to 
definitively permit interlocutory review for a specific issue.162  By providing clarity 
to interlocutory appeal criteria, steps can be taken towards developing a more 
expansive interlocutory appeal practice.163 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Changes are slow and arguably ineffective in improving fairness and efficiency.  
The Court and Congress skewed the rules in such a manner to continue adhering to 
the final judgment rule.  First, Congress appeared to have answered the discontent in 
the finality requirement by introducing section 1292(b).  On its face, this doctrine 
appears to ameliorate the litigant’s concern for fairness and efficiency.  However, its 
application to few interlocutory orders did not come close to improving fairness and 
efficiency or even addressing the litigant’s concerns. 
                                                           
 160 See, e.g., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF 
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 95 (1990).  The Committee explained, 
The state of the law on when a district court ruling is appealable because it is “final,” 
or is an appealable interlocutory action, strikes many observers as unsatisfactory in 
several respects.  The area has produced much purely procedural litigation.  Courts of 
appeals often dismiss appeals as premature.  Litigants sometimes face the possibility 
of waiving their right to appeal when they fail to seek timely review because it is 
unclear when a decision is “final” and the time for appeal begins to run.  Decisional 
doctrines—such as “practical finality” and especially the “collateral order” rule—blur 
the edges of the finality principle, require repeated attention from the Supreme Court, 
and may in some circumstances restrict too sharply the opportunity for interlocutory 
review. 
Id.; see also Martineau, supra note 21, at 747. 
 161 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. COURTS tbl.B (2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatist
ics/2011/tables/B00Mar11.pdf.  Even in state courts, where, over the past nine years, civil 
caseloads increased twenty-eight percent.  Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Civil Caseloads Level 
Off After Three Years of Growth, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (2010) [hereinafter Nat’l Ctr. for 
State Courts], http://www.courtstatistics.org/Civil/ CivilGrowth.aspx. 
 162 Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 161.  Currently, a common trend is expanding 
interlocutory review in cases involving class actions and patents.  See Thomas D. Nevins, 
Interlocutory Appeal from Denial of Twombly Motion to Dismiss in Text Messaging Antitrust 
Litigation, NAT’L L. REV. (2010), available at http://www.natlawreview. 
com/article/interlocutory-appeal-denial-twombly-motion-to-dismiss-text-messaging-antitrust-
litigation.  Thus, information on decision-making could help the legislature and the Court 
clarify criteria regarding interlocutory appeals. 
 163 The main benefactor from this clarity will likely be the Supreme Court.  Recent circuit 
splits have been resolved on the issues of interlocutory appeal by the Court.  See supra note 
28.  More information on judicial decisions and rationales would likely shed light on the 
existence of other splits and potential issues that need to be resolved. 
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Second, the Court employed a similar tactic by judicially creating the collateral 
order doctrine.  The doctrine allows petitions for interlocutory appeals, but the 
ultimate authority to grant such an appeal lies within the judiciary—the original 
proponent of the final judgment rule. 
Third, circuits apply various definitions to explain the collateral order doctrine’s 
factors.  For such an important rule, the doctrine does not aptly specify the 
conditions, nor has the Supreme Court sought to define the factors that would grant 
immediate appeals of non-final orders.  Granted, the courts share the goal of finality, 
resulting in consistent decisions; however, there is no uniformity in decisions that 
aid a party in preparing for court, because there is no way to predict what the court 
may decide. 
Commentators offer several suggestions164 that lack evidentiary support, leading 
to more criticisms.  The state court models provide legitimate examples that give 
credence to an argument for change.  They provide concrete evidence of what works 
and what does not.  The method is simple: 
(1) Permit petitions of all interlocutory appeals; 
(2) A single justice at the appellate level renders a decision based upon 
that judge’s discretion; and 
(3) Mandate written opinions explaining the decision to grant or deny a 
petition for interlocutory appeal. 
Allowing all appeals would promote fairness without inundating the court, 
because the single justice’s discretionary power and separate docket would conserve 
resources and promote judicial efficiency.  Additionally, the written opinions would 
provide clarity and predictability to aid litigation strategies.  This combination would 
enhance the original goal165 of expediting the dispute through the appellate system, 
with the added benefit of improving efficiency and maintaining fairness. 
 
 
 
                                                           
 164 See supra notes 91-93. 
 165 See Memorandum from Richard Van Duiezend, supra note 88.  Appellate review also 
provides: (1) uniform results; (2) higher probabilities of correct judgment; and (3) increased 
belief that a party’s dispute has been fully and fairly heard, which my approach would 
continue to uphold; see also Robertson, supra note 89. 
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